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COLLATERAL REVIEW OF CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCES: THE CASE FOR CORAM NOBIS
DouglasJ. Bench,Jr.*
Occasionally, criminals correctly interpret the law while courts err Litigation pur-
suant to the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) includes numerous
examples. The ACCA imposes harsher sentences upon felons in possession of fire-
arms with prior "violent felony" convictions. Over time, courts defined "violent" so
contrary to its common meaning that it eventually came to encompass driving
under the influence, unwanted touching, and the failure to report to correctional
facilities. However in a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has attempted
to clarify the meaning of violent in the context of the ACCA and, in the process,
excluded such offenses. The ultimate definition of violent and resulting litigation
also implicate career offender sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines,
because of similarities in the language of the Guidelines and the ACCA.
This Article is the first to examine the availability of collateral review of erroneous-
ly imposed career offender sentences resulting from the fluctuating definition of the
term "violent." The following offers an overview of the two traditional methods of
collateral review available to federal prisoners, motions to vacate and habeas cor-
pus petitions, and assesses the viability of each method. This Article argues for use
of the relatively obscure writ of error coram nobis, a safety valve for those who are
unable to obtain relief through a motion to vacate or a traditional habeas proceed-
ing. This Article concludes that, despite the writ's disfavored status, courts should
dust off the 16th century remedy. This would alleviate both the injustice of telling
prisoners who correctly interpreted the law that they were right, but are now with-
out remedy, and the social waste associated with unnecessary incarceration.
INTRODUCTION
"The common law tradition of the 'Great Writ' cannot be so mori-
bund, so shackled by the chains of procedural bars and rigid
gatekeeping that this court is not authorized to grant relief to one who
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. "'
* Death Penalty Law Clerk for the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, Missouri and Pennsylvania Bar member, J.D., 2006, Cornell University,
B.A., 2003 University of Pittsburgh. The author wishes to thank Honorable Keith A. Pesto,
Rosalie J. Hornick, Tony E Girard, Carol Wright-Burkett, and the editorial staff of the Uni-
versity of Michigan journal of Law Reform for their insightful comments and assistance with this
Article.
1. Gilbert v. United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 716
(11th Cir. 2010) (vacating panel decision pending outcome of en banc rehearing).
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Ezell Gilbert pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
marijuana and crack cocaine. Pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, he was classified as a career offender.3 Because of this
classification, his Guideline range sentence was between 292-365
months, as opposed to the 151-188 months applicable to defend-
ants who are not career offenders. At sentencing, Gilbert objected
to his classification as a career offender, arguing that his prior con-
viction for carrying a concealed firearm was not a crime of violence.
The sentencing court agreed that Gilbert's sentence was too severe
under this enhancement, but concluded that it could not impose a
lesser sentence. "The fact that I think the sentence is too high is
immaterial .... I don't see any authority under the law for me to
downwardly depart.6 So, counsel, I have given you reversible error if
you can convince the Eleventh Circuit that I'm wrong."' Accordingly,
the Court imposed a 292-months sentence.' Gilbert appealed, but
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that carrying a concealed weapon is
a crime of violence.' The U.S. Supreme Court denied Gilbert's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari and his pro se motion to vacate pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was denied."o
Eventually, the Eleventh Circuit abrogated its earlier decision in
light of Supreme Court precedent, concluding that carrying a con-
cealed firearm was not a violent felony." Gilbert, with his position
now vindicated by the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit,
again attempted to collaterally attack his sentence, but the Gov-
ernment argued that Gilbert could not file a second motion to
vacate or seek a traditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.12 The District Court observed that:
Unfortunately, Mr. Gilbert is in the unenviable position of
having to remain in prison even though under the present in-
terpretation of the law he is no longer deemed a career
offender and has served the time that would be required of
2. Gilbert, 609 F.3d at 1160.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1161.
6. Gilbert's sentencing preceded Booker v. Washington, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (making
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory).
7. Gilbert, 609 F.3d at 1161.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1162 (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)).
12. Id.
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him were he sentenced today. Salt to the wound is that he le-
gally challenged the very issue that now incarcerates him-but
lost. It is faint justice to tell him now that he was right but
there is no legal remedy. Having exhausted all avenues known
to the court, the Court determines that at this time it is una-
ble to provide relief to Mr. Gilbert under the law as it
currently exists.
Joshua Lindsey pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a fel-
on." The District Court imposed a sentence of 77 months, based
upon an enhanced sentence Guideline range of 77-96 months,
because of his two prior violent felony convictions, one of which
was for driving under the influence.15 Following a Supreme Court
decision holding that driving under the influence is not a violent
felony, Lindsey filed a motion to vacate his sentence." The District
Court denied relief, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis
that Lindsey procedurally defaulted on his claim by failing to raise
it at sentencing or on direct appeal. However, at the time of sen-
tencing, driving under the influence was clearly established as a
violent felony in the Eighth Circuit.17 The Court stated that it was
"not unsympathetic to Lindsey's contention that he should be ex-
cused for failing to make an argument that, at the time, had no
chance of success either at the district court or before this court."'
However, the Court concluded that this "perceived futility" was
not sufficient to excuse the default." Finally, the Court concluded
that Lindsey's default could not be excused based upon "actual
innocence" of this sentencing enhancement, because he had not
20received a capital sentence.
Gilbert's and Lindsey's problems illustrate the circumstances of
many prisoners who challenged sentence enhancements based up-
on prior convictions that were obviously not violent, were
ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, or
who abstained from such challenges based upon the law of their cir-
cuits. These prisoners are left without collateral remedy because of
the gatekeeping requirements imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thus,
an unknown number of federal prisoners are serving additional
13. Id.
14. Lindsey v. United States, 615 F.3d 998, 999 (8th Cir. 2010).
15. Id. at 1000.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 972 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1000-01 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535 (1986)).
20. Id. at 1001.
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years in prison due to errors made by their sentencing courts.
However, because the errors do not fit neatly into either category
of collateral remedy traditionally available to federal prisoners,
they find themselves trapped in an absurd situation where they
must serve additional years in prison that were erroneously im-
posed because they are without a remedy.
This Article begins in Part I and II by examining how the word
"violent" has been defined in terms of the Armed Career Criminal
Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Having illustrated a signif-
icant problem, Part III articulates the costs of unnecessary
incarceration. Part IV then examines the availability of motions to
vacate and habeas corpus petitions, and points to a subset of pris-
oners who are left without collateral remedy to attack their
erroneously enhanced sentences. The Article concludes by arguing
in favor of the use of the writ of error coram nobis for those inmates
with no other means of collateral review.
I. THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years on any felon possessing a fire-
arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)21 who has had three prior
violent felony convictions or serious drug offenses. The ACCA
defines a violent felony as any crime punishable by imprisonment
of greater than one year that "has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of an-
other . . . or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another .... ' The Act places
no limits upon the number of years a sentencing court can look
24
back to prior convictions and explicitly provides for the inclusion
of offenses committed while a defendant was a minor. The ACCA
21. More specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits a felon, an illegal alien, an unlawful
user of a controlled substance, or a fugitive from shipping, transporting, possessing, or re-
ceiving any firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. This
prohibition does not apply to state employees possessing firearms in the course of their
employment. See Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1978).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
23. Id. § 924(e) (2) (B) (i)-(ii). The last phrase is commonly referred to as the "other-
wise" provision.
24. See, e.g., United States v. McClinton, 815 E2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming
a sentence enhancement based upon three burglaries committed 22 years prior).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 574 E3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
ACCA explicitly applies to acts ofjuvenile delinquency that involve the use or carrying of a
158 [VOL. 45:1
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was passed in 1984 to reduce crimes attributable to repeat offend-
ers. The Judiciary Committee Report quotes former Senator Arlen
Specter who explained that " [m] ost robberies and burglaries are
committed by career criminals .... In New York City, for example,
studies showed that only 1,100 recidivists were probably responsi-
ble for most of the 100,000 robberies each year. Another study
showed that only 49 imprisoned robbers admitted committing
10,000 felonies over 20 years."2 This sentence enhancement was a
compromise derived from earlier legislation seeking federal prose-
cution of repeat offenders who commit crimes that are
traditionally non-federal and local."
Although the ACCA, as originally passed, targeted only those
criminals with prior robbery or burglary convictions, Congress ex-
panded its scope in 1986 to include any violent felony or serious
drug offense.2 ' Because of this amendment, the meaning of "vio-
lent" has become a point of frequent litigation, often resulting in
outcomes that defy the common usage of the term. By interpret-
ing "violent" felonies differently from common usage,o defendants
are, to some degree, deprived of notice that their sentences could
be enhanced. Yet, as prisoners' more literal interpretations were
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would have been a felony had the juvenile been an
adult based upon 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (a)).
26. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 3 (1984).
27. 130 CONG. REc. 28,095 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
28. H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 6 (1986).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming the Dis-
trict Court's finding that an inmate's unimpeded escape through the open door of a
correctional facility was "violent"); United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir.
2009) (finding evasion of arrest to be "violent"); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745-46
(7th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding driving
under the influence to be "violent" in the context of the ACCA), rev'd, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
But see United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding it to be "common
sense" that driving under the influence is not violent).
30. See generally WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1961 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2002)(defining violence as "la: an
exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse (as in warfare or in effecting an en-
trance into a house) b: an instance of violent treatment or procedure .. .. ").
31. It has long been considered unjust to punish individuals without first giving notice
of the illegality of their actions. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798) ("Legislatures
of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall
have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it .... All these, and similar
laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive."). Similarly, the Due Process Clause prohibits the
enforcement of laws so vague as to deprive defendants of at least constructive notice of the
illegality of their actions. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) ("The vice of
vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either in determining what per-
sons are included or what acts are prohibited. Words which are vague and fluid may be as
much a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula.") (citations omitted). It is
equally difficult to conceive of Larry Begay foreseeing a district court enhancing his sen-
tence based upon DUI convictions.
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vindicated in a series of Supreme Court decisions, they have often
been left without remedy. However, before addressing the meaning
of "violence," it was necessary for the Supreme Court to first de-
termine how sentencing courts should evaluate prior convictions.
A. The Categorical Approach
The ACCA is silent on how a court should review a defendant's
past convictions. One possibility would be for each court to con-
duct a factual inquiry to determine whether a defendant's conduct
was violent. The obvious flaw with this approach is the potential
waste of judicial resources associated with conducting mini-trials of
stale crimes. Moreover, a defendant's conduct might have been
violent, but the crime to which he or she pled guilty may not have
required violent conduct, thus limiting the usefulness of any factu-
al inquiry because the ACCA applies to convictions, not conduct.
An alternative approach would examine the language of the opera-
tive statute. This approach eliminates inefficient factual inquiries,
but creates unjust results in a small number of cases where a de-
fendant acted non-violently while committing a crime typically
characterized by violence.
The Supreme Court adopted the second option, known as the
"categorical approach" to review prior convictions. In Taylor v. Unit-
ed States,2 the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1), but reserved the right to challenge his designation as
a career offender based, in part, upon two prior burglary convic-
tions in violation of Missouri law.3 In addressing whether burglary
is a violent felony, the Supreme Court concluded that the ACCA's
reference to three "convictions" required sentencing courts to look
at the language of the statute a defendant was convicted of violat-
34ing. The Court further noted the inefficiency and unfairness of a
factual approach:
Would the Government be permitted to introduce the trial
transcript before the sentencing court, or if no transcript is
available, present the testimony of witnesses? . . . Also, in cases
where the defendant pleaded guilty, there often is no record
of the underlying facts. Even if the Government were able to
prove those facts, if a guilty plea to a lesser. . . offense was the
32. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
33. Id. at 577.
34. See id. at 599.
160 [VOL. 45:1
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result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to impose a sen-
tence enhancement as if the defendant has pleaded guilty to
burglary."
Yet, in implementing this "categorical approach," courts strug-
gled with statutes that included elements of both violent and non-
violent conduct. More specifically, courts diverged on the extent to
which they would look beyond the statute to examine the charging
documents in order to determine the specific subsection under
which a defendant was convicted or had pleaded guilty.36 The Su-
preme Court clarified this evaluation process through a series of
decisions establishing the "modified categorical approach." In
Shepard v. United States, the Court stated that sentencing courts are
not limited to charges and jury instructions, as the findings of fact
and statements of factual basis for the charge would be the equiva-
lent documents in bench trials and pleaded cases." However,
courts can only consider facts demonstrating that a defendant must
have engaged in violent conduct to have been convicted of violat-
ing a given statute or subsection thereof.3" Thus, when a defendant
is convicted of violating a statute that could be violated with violent
or non-violent conduct, courts can consider documents showing
that a defendant's conviction was necessarily the result of violent
conduct. As a result, courts cannot consider documents such as
police reports or complaint applications that were not presented to
a jury. The Court reaffirmed the Shepard description of reviewable
documents in Johnson v. United States, but also cited Shepard in sup-
port of the proposition that sentencing courts must presume a
defendant was convicted of violating the least violent subsection of
35. Id. at 601-02.
36. Some courts limit review to the actual charge and elements necessary to the con-
viction. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 966 F2d 703, 704-06 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542,
547-48 (11th Cir. 1990). Other jurisdictions have examined the conduct in the indictment,
even if it is not a necessary element of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 469, 472
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 856 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Johnson, 953 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1991). Finally, some courts broadly examine the under-
lying facts to assess the risk posed by the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cornelius, 931 E2d 490, 493
(8th Cir. 1991).
37. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010).
38. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("We hold that
enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a
nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is limited to the
terms of the charging document, the terms of the plea agreement or transcript of colloquy
between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.").
39. Id. at 25-26.
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a statute when the records do not clearly indicate which subsection
a defendant violated. As a result, a defendant with a prior convic-
tion pursuant to a statute that prohibits both violent and non-
violent conduct is given the benefit of the doubt if the government
is unable to demonstrate otherwise with acceptable documents.
Courts then must apply this categorical approach to the Supreme
Court's definition of a "violent felony."
B. Interpreting Decisions
1. Begay v. United States
Larry Begay was convicted of driving under the influence of al-
cohol in violation of section 66-8-102 of New Mexico's Code twelve
times." In New Mexico, a driver's fourth conviction for driving un-
der the influence is a felony, as is each subsequent conviction.42
Following Begay's guilty plea to possession of a firearm as a felon,
the sentencing court enhanced Begay's sentence based upon his
prior driving under the influence convictions, reasoning that the
offense creates a substantial risk of injury." On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that driving under the influence was
not a violent felony. The Court explained that "the provision's
listed examples .. . illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the
statute's scope .... Their presence indicates that the statute covers
only similar crimes . ... "" The Court further reasoned that the
listed crimes "all typically involve purposeful, 'violent', and 'aggres-
sive' conduct."4 6 The Court listed a series of felonies not typically
associated with career offenders, namely, reckless pollution, negli-
gent pollution, reckless tampering with consumer products, and
inattention to duty of sailors resulting in shipwrecks.4 ' Accordingly,
the Begay test requires that an offense be similar in risk and in kind
to the example offenses to qualify as a violent felony under subsec-
tion (ii) of the statute." Further, the Court proceeded to imply a
mens rea requirement, quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft4 in support of the
40. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1269 (2010).
41. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008).
42. Id.
43. United States v. Begay, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1141,1144 (D.N.M. 2005).
44. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148.
45. Id. at 142.
46. Id. at 144-45.
47. Id. at 143.
48. Id. at 144.
49. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
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proposition that "the word 'use' . . . most naturally suggests a high-
er degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct
. . . .".o Based upon the lack of intent required to commit driving
under the influence, the Court held that this offense is not suffi-
ciently similar in kind to the example offenses, and as a result, not
a violent felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2) (B) (ii).5' The Court further explained that the ACCA
was intended to target conduct that "makes it more likely that an
offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to
*harm a victim."52 The Court concluded that driving under the in-
fluence is not the type of behavior the ACCA was intended to
target.53
2. Chambers v. United States
Following Begay, the Supreme Court addressed crimes of escape
committed by failing to report to a correctional facility. In Chambers
v. United States, Deondery Chambers pleaded guilty to possessing a
firearm as a felon, but argued that one of his prior felonies,
"fail[ing] to report to a penal institution," was not violent within
the meaning of the ACCA." The Seventh Circuit expressed doubt
about the violent nature and risk of injury posed by those who fail
to report, noting that one could violate the statute simply by show-
ing up an hour late. Despite its palpable distaste for this holding,
50. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 145 ("By way of contrast, statutes that forbid driving under the influence ...
typically do not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct; rather, they are, or are
most nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict liability, criminalizing conduct in re-
spect to which the offender need not have any criminal intent at all.").
53. Id. at 145-46. Additionally, Courts of Appeals are divided on whether Begay estab-
lished a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding recklessness level of intent insufficient); United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441,
448 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (same);
United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Mendez-
Casarez, 624 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (appearing to require intent to commit the
crime); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding criminal negligence
insufficient, recklessness not decided). But see United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250,
1258 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding no mens rea requirement).
54. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 690 (2009).
55. In United States v. Chanbers, 473 F.3d 724, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2007), Judge Posner,
writing for the appellate panel, stated that:
We shall adhere to the precedents for now. But it is an embarrassment to the law
when judges base decisions of consequence on conjectures, in this case a conjecture
as to the possible danger of physical injury posed by criminals who fail to show up to
begin serving their sentences or fail to return from furloughs or to halfway houses.
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the Court upheld the sentence enhancement out of deference to
precedent.56 However, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that a "failure to report" was not a "violent felony" within the
meaning of the ACCA." The Court reasoned that the crime was a
form of inaction, "a far cry from the 'purposeful, violent, and ag-
gressive conduct' potentially at issue when an offender uses
explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or
residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion."5  The Court
rejected the Government's argument that failing to report demon-
strates a defendant's "strong aversion to penal custody."55
3. Johnson v. United States
Recently, the Supreme Court has also addressed simple battery.
In Johnson v. United States, Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to pos-
sessing ammunition as a felon.o Johnson argued that his prior
battery conviction, under section 784.03(1) (a) of the Florida Code,
was not a "violent felony" for purposes of the ACCA." The Code
provides that an individual commits battery by: "[a]ctually and in-
tentionally touch [ing] or strik[ing] another person against the will
of the other or [by] intentionally caus [ing] bodily harm to another
person."6 This offense is generally a misdemeanor; however, it be-
The head of the line of cases that lump all escapes together, United States v. Gosling, 39
F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994), states in colorful language quoted in many of the
subsequent cases that 'every escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not
explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but
which always has the serious potential to do so . ... A defendant who escapes from a
jail is likely to possess a variety of supercharged emotions, and in evading those trying
to recapture him, may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or even
fellow escapees .... [E]ven in a case where a defendant escapes from ajail by stealth
and injures no one in the process, there is still a serious risk that injury will result
when officers find the defendant and attempt to place him in custody.' (Emphasis in
original.) This is conjecture floating well free of any facts-even the facts of Gosling.
The opinion says nothing about the nature of Goslin's escape, but the reference to
escaping from a jail suggests that the court wasn't thinking about walkaway escapes,
or failures to return or report, but aboutjail breaks (most jail breaks are stealthy). Its
ruminations should not be treated as authoritative in a case that does not involve a
jail break.
56. Id. at 726.
57. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691-92.
58. Id. at 692.
59. Id.
60. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1268-69 (2010).
61. Id.
62. FLA. STAT. § 784.03(1) (a) (2011).
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comes a third degree felony63 if a defendant has a prior battery
conviction. 4 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the sentence enhance-
ment, deferring to prior panel decisions.65 Reviewing the case, the
Supreme Court applied the modified categorical approach, but
noted that "nothing in the record ofJohnson's 2003 battery convic-
tion permitted the District Court to conclude that it rested upon
anything more than the least of these acts ... [thus] his conviction
was ... a 'violent felony' . .. only if 'actually and intentionally
touching' another person constitutes the use of 'physical force'
.... "6 In determining whether mere unwanted touching constitut-
ing battery is a violent felony, the Court adopted the Seventh
Circuit's definition of force, to wit, "physical force" means violent
force-that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to
another person.6 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the mere
unwanted touching of another individual was not a sufficient use
of physical force to constitute a violent felony."
Though the definition of "violent felony" remains nebulous, it is
evident after Begay, Chambers, and Johnson that strict liability felo-
nies, felonies characterized by inaction, and felonies susceptible to
violation with levels of force not capable of causing physical pain or
injury are not violent. As a result, a portion of defendants who re-
ceived enhanced sentences under the ACCA before these decisions
will serve additional years because of sentencing court errors if
they are unable to effectively collaterally attack their sentences.
II. APPLICATION TO U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The scope of these decisions has ramifications beyond the ap-
proximately ten percent of federal sentences that are for firearms
violations69 each year.76 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommend
63. In United States v. Rodiguez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008), a defendant who received an en-
hanced sentence pursuant to the ACCA argued that a prior felony drug conviction should
not count, as the underlying offense was a misdemeanor that was elevated to a felony based
upon prior convictions. The Court rejected this argument, stating that "an offense commit-
ted by a repeat offender is often thought to reflect greater culpability and thus to merit
greater punishment." Id. at 385.
64. SeeFLA. STAT. § 784.03(2).
65. United States v.Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2008).
66. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1269 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1271 (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003)).
68. Id. at 1273.
69. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, SoURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
Tics, Figure A (2009).
70. Prior convictions for violent felonies are typically a factor in all federal firearms of-
fenses, as those offenses not covered by the ACCA are encompassed by U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2) (two prior convictions) or U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (one prior conviction).
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harsher sentences for "career offenders." A defendant is a "career
offender" if he or she was at least eighteen years old at the time of
the current federal offense, the current offense is a felony arising
from either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,
and "the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of ei-
ther a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense."7 1 A
"crime of violence" is any offense under federal or state law pun-
ishable by imprisonment in excess of one year that "has an element
of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another" or is "burglary of a dwelling, arson, or ex-
tortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to anoth-
er."7' This definition is very similar to the ACCA definition of a
"violent felony" as any crime punishable by imprisonment of great-
er than one year that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another . . . . The similarity between the terms
"crime of violence" as used in the Guidelines and "violent felony"
in the ACCA typically leads them to be used interchangeably. As a
result, courts apply decisions clarifying "violent felony" under the
ACCA to sentences enhanced pursuant to the Guidelines.
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 411.1 (a) (2011).
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (i)-(ii) (2006).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 629 E3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Begay
to Sentencing Guidelines case); United States v. Terrell, 621 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applying definitions in a "parallel manner"); United States v. Lee, 612 E3d 170, 196 n.33
(3d Cir. 2010) (applying Begay to Sentencing Guidelines case); United States v. Womack, 610
F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying same interpretation to both definitions); United
States v. Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619, 621 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Given their nearly identical defi-
nitions, we construe the statutory term 'violent felony' and the Guidelines term 'crime of
violence' as interchangeable."); United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009)
(applying James, Begay, and Chambers to a Sentencing Guidelines case); United States v.
LaCasse, 567 E3d 763, 765 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421
(6th Cir. 2009) in support of applying ACCA analysis to Guidelines case); United States v.
Tiger, 538 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying Begay to Sentencing Guidelines case);
United States v. Parnell, 524 E3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding authority interpreting one
phrase to be persuasive to interpreting the other); United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114,
118 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Andrews, 479 F.3d 894, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying
Shepard and Taylor to Sentencing Guidelines case); United States v. Montgomery, 402 F.3d
482, 488 n.28 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the language to be identical).
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III. THE COST OF ERRONEOUSLY ENHANCED SENTENCES
In the five years prior to the Begay decision, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission estimates that District Courts imposed 12,731 en-
hanced sentences pursuant to section 411.1 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines and the ACCA.75 As a result, at considerable human and
social cost, an unknown number of inmates are serving additional
years beyond the sentences district courts would have imposed had
they reached proper violent felony determinations.
Prisoners impose at least two types of costs upon society: (1) the
direct costs of incarceration, including expenses such as prison
staff, prison facility operations, food, clothing, medical care, etc.,
and (2) opportunity costs, the wages those prisoners would have
generated absent incarceration. Not only would such wages likely
have been taxable income, they also could have been sources of
support for family members dependent upon those now incarcer-
ated, whose family members may have now be more dependent on
social welfare programs. Regardless of the tax revenue generated
from these wages or the level of support they would have provided
to inmate families, the wages would have been spent, contributing
to GDP. In a 2004 study of prison expenditures, the Department of
Justice noted that it costs the Federal Bureau of Prisons an average
of $22,632 a year to house one inmate. Those incarcerated in pri-
vate prisons appear to impose only slightly lower direct
incarceration costs upon society." A 1999 study by David Anderson,
attempting to establish the true aggregate cost of crime, estimated
that the opportunity cost of each individual incarcerated was
$23,286, based upon the average wages earned by persons with the
levels of education, age, and experience of the average prisoner,
75. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT SOURCEBOOK, Table 22
(2007) (2,290 career offender sentences, 656 ACCA sentences); U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT SOURCEBOOK, Table 22 (2006) (2,124 career offender sentences,
575 ACCA sentences); U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT SOURCEBOOK,
Table 22 (2005) (407 career offender sentences pre-Booker, 1574 career offender sentences,
post-Booker, 160 ACCA sentences pre-Booker, 466 ACCA sentences, post-Booker); U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT SOURCEBOOK, Table 22 (2004) (1,349 career
offender sentences, pre-Blakely, 415 career offender sentences, post-Blakely, 411 ACCA sen-
tences, pre-Blakely, 130 ACCA sentences, post-Blakely); U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2003
ANNUAL REPORT SOURCEBOOK, Table 22 (2003) (1,713 career offender sentences, 461 ACCA
sentences).
76. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES 1
(2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1 174.
77. See Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the Quality of Confinement and Cost-
Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: How We Know, Why We Do Not Know More, and Where
to Go from Here, 83 PRISONJ. 301, 313 (2003).
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subtracting the value of any goods produced while in prison.7
However, this calculation assumes prisoners do not return to crim-
inal activity as a means of support." Anderson notes that the
opportunity cost of incarceration could be as low as $5,700 per
year, when accounting for the possibility that a portion of prisoners
may rely upon illicit means of obtaining income.
As a result, it is reasonable to estimate the cost of each year of
unnecessary incarceration resulting from erroneous career offend-
er designations to be at least $28,332, the direct cost of
incarceration combined with the low estimate of opportunity costs,
and as much as $45,918, the direct cost of incarceration combined
with the high estimate of opportunity costs, per inmate. These es-
timates do not take into account other possible costs, such as
litigation expenses resulting from prisoner civil rights cases that
utilize scarce judicial resources." Unless courts utilize a variant of
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a combination thereof, prisoners will
endure unduly harsh sentences while forfeiting wages and impos-
ing direct incarceration costs on society.
IV. COLLATERAL REVIEW
A. Retroactivity
As a general rule, new substantive rules apply retroactively, in-
cluding decisions that narrow the scope of criminal statutes."
Constitutional decisions altering rules of criminal procedure, in
contrast, are not retroactive to convictions that became final before
the decisions were announced. In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme
Court held that new rules of criminal procedure are not applicable
to cases that have become final before the new rule84 is announced
unless they fall within one of two exceptions: (1) rules making cer-




81. These estimates are drawn from empirical studies conducted by others and are in-
tended to illustrate the social waste generated when individuals serve longer sentences
because sentencing courts incorrectly imposed career offender sentences, not as definitive
calculations of current incarceration costs.
82. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).
83. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
84. A rule is "new" if it was not "dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (1989).
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tain conduct beyond the power of criminal law to prohibit, or
(2) rules that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 5
It is not clear, however, whether Begay announced a new substan-
tive rule, or whether the decision is more closely analogous to a
procedural rule. For example, the Tenth Circuit has determined
that Chambers, a progeny of Begay determining that "failure to re-
port" escapes are not violent, applies retroactively."' In United States
v. Shipp,'the Court explained:
In light of Chambers, Mr. Shipp does not constitute an "armed
career criminal" for purposes of the ACCA and thus he re-
ceived "a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."
Where, as here, Mr. Shipp was sentenced beyond the statutory
maximum for his offense of conviction, his due process rights
817were violated.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Begay did not narrow the ele-
ments of a criminal offense, but rather reduced the maximum
allowable sentences for some defendants." As a result, Begay is dis-
tinguishable from United States v. Booker, which made the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory,"9 because Booker did not reduce
any maximum sentences and, thus, was not given retroactive ef-
fect." Nationally, district courts are divided on the issue 1 In order
85. Id. at 310.
86. United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009).
87. Id. at 1091.
88. Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 414-15 (7th Cir. 2010).
89. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
90. Welch, 604 F.3d at 415.
91. CompareJackson v. United States, 1:10-cv-4\1:00-cr-23, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4482,
2011 WL 144913 at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011) (finding Chambers not to be retroactive,
noting split in authority on retroactivity); United States v. McGowan, Cr. No. 6:06-989-HMH,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117265, 2010 WL 4595809 at *S-*7 (D. S.C. Nov. 3, 2010) (not retro-
active); Grant v. Pearson, 5:09-cv-149(DCB)(MTP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44744, 2010 WL
1860004 at *6 (W.D. Miss. May 7, 2010) (same); United States v. Ross, No. 09-cv-779-bbc,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980, 2010 WL 148397, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2010) (same); Unit-
ed States v. Jones, No. 6:09-7082-DCR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160, 2010 WL 55930, at *3--*6
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2010) (same); Kirkland v. United States, No. 3:09-CV-335 RLM, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99620, 2009 WL 3526185, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2009) (same); United States
v. Johnson, No. 04-269 (MJD/AJB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74946, 2009 WL 2611279, at *3-
*4 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2009) (same); Sun Bear v. United States, No. CIV 08-3021, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60188, 2009 WL 2033028, at *3-*4 (D. S.D. July 9, 2009) (same); United States
v. Narvaez, No. 09-cv-222-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41141, 2009 WL 1351811, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. May 12, 2009) (same); Lindsey v. United States, No. 09-0249-CV-W-ODS, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65621, 2009 WL 2337120, at *2 (W.D. Mo.July 29, 2009) (same); and United States v.
Campbell, No. 6:06-812-HMH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37542, 2009 WL 1254287, at *1 (D.
S.C. May 1, 2009) (same), with United States v. Dean, 10 C 50301, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1878, 2011 WL 62132 at *2 (N.D. 1Il.Jan. 7, 2011) (retroactive, citing Welch); United States v.
Nelson, 10-cv-61-bbc,03-cr-175-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 123799, 2010 WL 4806976 at *4
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to obtain collateral relief, Begay and similar cases must be applied
retroactively. Collateral attacks before district courts or in circuits
that do not apply these decisions retroactively cannot succeed. Be-
cause Begay and its progeny do not place certain conduct beyond
the scope of the power of criminal law to prohibit and because the-
se decisions are not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
courts applying these decisions retroactively must have concluded
that Begay established a new substantive rule.
B. Common Law Habeas Corpus
For centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has been the subject of
historical debate and, on occasion, euphoric praise. Early twentieth
century English legal historian William Holdsworth regarded the
writ as "the most efficient protection ever invented for the liberty
of the subject."2 Although often thought to be related to the
Magna Carta,9 the writ was used as a procedural device in 1199,
sixteen years prior to the enactment of the Magna Carta." Darnel's
Case, a dispute arising from the King's forced loan policy whereby
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2010) (citing Welch) (same); Zollicoffer v. Rios, Case No. 10-cv-1238,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82916, 2010 WL 3211061 at *5 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2010) (citing Welch)
(same); United States v. Lillard, 8:02CR374, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82142, 2010 WL 3171504
at *7 (D. Neb. Aug. 10, 2010) (retroactive); Brown v. United States, 1:09-CV-2770-TWT-CCH,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74379, 2010 WL 2927339 at *5 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2010) (Report and
Recommendation adopted by District Court on July 23, 2010) (same); United States v.
Fondren, No. 4:06-CR-22 CEJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93102, 2009 WL 3246906, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 6, 2009) (same); Kendrick v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-447-Oc-1OGRJ, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88291, 2009 WL 2958976, at *2 (E.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2009) (same); United States
v. Blue, No. 09-1108, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74331, 2009 WL 2581284, at *3--*4 (D. Kan. Aug.
20, 2009) (finding Chambers to be retroactive); Frederick v. United States, No. 08-22143-CV,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72071, 2009 WL 2488965, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2009) (retroactive)
(adopting magistrate judge's report finding Begay to be retroactive); McCarty v. United
States, No. 8:08-cv-1619-T-24TBM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518, 2009 WL 1456386, at *2
(M.D. Fla. May 22, 2009) (retroactive); George v. United States, 650 F Supp. 2d 1196, 1200
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (same); United States v. McElroy, No. 09-CV-0040-CVE-PJC, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42059, 2009 WL 1372908, at *2-*3 (N.D. Okla. May 14, 2009) (same); United States
v. Radabaugh, No. 08-CV-762-CVE-TLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17239, 2009 WL 565065, at *5
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2009) (same); United States v. Leonard, No. 08-CV-0389-CVE-FHM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15957, 2009 WL 499357, at *3--*4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 2009) (same); and
United States v. Glover, No. 08-CV-0261-CVE-FHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56889, 2008 WL
2951085, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 28, 2008) (same).
92. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 227 (4th ed. 1931).
93. See Darnel's Case (Five Knights Case) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 8, 18 (KB. 1627) (arguing in
early habeas case that the Magna Carta dictates that a person cannot lawfully be imprisoned
without due process).
94. DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND THE MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF
POWER AND LIBERTY 8 (1966); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (stating that
habeas is of "immemorial antiquity," deriving its roots from the thirty-third year of King
Edward I, indicating possible usage in 1305).
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those refusing to loan funds to the Crown were imprisoned, is of-
ten cited as an early example of the modern writ. However, the
Lord Chief Justice noted that in all past precedents, those attempt-
ing to utilize the writ as a means of relief were denied once it was
demonstrated that they were being held under the orders of the
King." As a result, Darnel and the other knights were unsuccess-
ful.9 6 Perhaps a better first instance of the use of a predecessor to
the modern writ can be found in an unnamed case before the
Court of Chancery in 1341 . In this case, the defendant sued for
his release from prison, after having been arrested by the sheriff
upon the allegation of a woman that he and two other persons
failed to satisfy a statute merchantC8 made to her.9 The prisoner
obtained his release by producing a general and special acquit-
tance.o00
The modern writ most closely and directly originates from the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.'0 Following the enactment of
the Habeas Corpus Act, English courts interpreted that the intent
of the writ was to "provide against any restraint of the party's liber-
ty.",o2 In U.S. jurisprudence, the writ quickly took on Sir. Edward
Coke's moniker as the "great writ of liberty., 03 It has, on occasion,
received almost unrealistically favorable praise:
It is not denied that the great function of the writ of habeas
corpus is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned with-
out just authority of law .... [H] abeas corpus, which has been
often characterized as the great writ of liberty, and may be re-
garded, not less than the right of trial by jury, as one of the
chief corner-stones in the structure of our judiciary system.o4
95. Darnel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. at 57.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Case 12 (1341) YB. 14 Edw. 3, Rolls Series, p. 204 (translated by Luke Owen Pike,
1888). This case is listed as having been decided in 1340, but is typically cited as 1341, likely
because it appears in Year Book 14 of King Edward's reign, which started in 1327, making
this the year book for 1341 and, hence, 1341 the "publication date."
98. A thirteenth century statute establishing procedures to secure and recover debts,
providing for a commercial bond that, if not paid, resulted in the execution on the lands,
goods, and body of the debtor. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1421 (7th ed. 1999).
99. Case 12, YB. 14 Edw. 3, at 204.
100. Id.
101. The writ was promptly introduced to the colonies in the New York Charter of Lib-
erties of 1683. H.D. Hazelton, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional
Development, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12 (1917).
102. King v. Smith, 27 Eng. Rep. 787 (1736).
103. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 619 (1842).
104. In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503, 508-16 (1883).
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Yet, despite the praise, habeas corpus is frequently an ineffective or
unavailable remedy to prisoners who have been erroneously sen-
tenced as career offenders or armed career criminals.
C. Section 2255 vs. Section 2241
Federal inmates generally challenge their convictions and sen-
tences through motions to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. If
prisoners raised challenges to their enhanced sentences in their
initial § 2255 motions, this remedy would be efficient and effective.
Many inmates, however, had already challenged their sentences via
§ 2255 motion by the time favorable Supreme Court decisions ren-
dered their prior convictions non-violent. A portion of these
inmates, most likely those who have served more than the statutory
maximum sentence for non-career criminals, will be able to obtain
relief with traditional 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petitions.
The remaining inmates, however, have become impaled with a
"Morton's Fork,"'05 as a review of recent decisions reveals they can
pursue relief via § 2255, only to have their successive petitions de-
nied because Begay is not a new decision of constitutional law, or
they can pursue relief via § 2241, but have their petitions denied,
as most courts consider a § 2255 motion an adequate remedy (just
impossible for prisoners to utilize). The result is that prisoners who
have not committed the requisite number of violent felonies to re-
ceive the sentences imposed upon them are left without a
collateral remedy. Such a result constitutes not only an injustice to
those prisoners caught between alternative, but equally unavailable
remedies, but also a considerable social waste, in light of the ex-
penses associated with each year of unnecessary incarceration.
1. Section 2255
Although a habeas remedy has generally been available to feder-
al prisoners since the Judiciary Act of 1789, prisoners typically
challenge their sentences and convictions with 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motions before their sentencing courts. This statute specifically
105. The term is derived from the practices of John Morton, Lord Chancellor of Eng-
land, who, in 1487 devised a tax collection policy whereby subjects with affluent lifestyles
were deemed able to contribute to the King based upon their ability to spend lavishly while
those living modest lifestyles were also deemed able to contribute, as they were presumed to
be hoarding their wealth. See Kohorst v. Van Wert Cnty. Hosp., No. 3:09CV2031, 2010 WL
4883784, at *5 & n.2. (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2010).
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prohibits the use of habeas corpus to obtain relief available by
§ 2255 motion.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a pris-
oner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant
to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the
applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him re-
lief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.0 6
The Supreme Court explained that this motion replaced tradi-
tional habeas corpus for federal prisoners (at least in the first
instance) with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion
with the sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was, in-
ter alia, "imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States."o' In creating this alternative to a traditional habeas
petition, Congress was attempting to resolve "practical difficulties"
arising from the administration of habeas petitions, namely that
courts with territorial jurisdictions encompassing large prisons
were overwhelmed with petitions, but not to reduce the collateral
review rights typically afforded prisoners.' As a result, federal
prisoners must typically challenge their sentences with § 2255 mo-
tions.1 0
a. Time Limits
Prisoners seeking relief via a § 2255 motion must act within the
statutory one-year time limit. This one-year period begins on:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction be-
comes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a mo-
tion created by governmental action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is re-
moved, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
107. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774-75 (2008) (quoting United States v. Hay-
man, 342 U.S. 205, 207 n.1 (1952)).
108. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219.
109. Cf Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d
1295, 1304 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000)
(per curium).
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(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.o
Accordingly, prisoners seeking § 2255 relief based upon the Begay
decision must have filed their motions within one year of the April
16, 2008 decision date, or within one year of their convictions be-
coming final, whichever is later. The decision dates for Chambers
and Johnson are January 13, 2009, and March 2, 2010, respectively.
Prisoners who have missed this deadline, perhaps due to their rela-
tively limited ability to conduct legal research, are left to argue for
equitable tolling.
b. Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling is not amenable to bright line rules.'" Since the
Supreme Court has not addressed the availability of equitable toll-
ing, it has never had cause to establish a standard.'12 It is not
entirely clear that equitable tolling is permissible under § 2255.
The Supreme Court has refused to apply equitable tolling to other
schemes where the statutes included time limitations that were
plain, specific, and detailed.'13 Courts applying equitable tolling to
§ 2255 motions after the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) presume that Congress "legislates
against the background of existing jurisprudence unless it specifi-
cally negates that jurisprudence."" Because equitable tolling
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
111. Fisher v.Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999).
112. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) ("We have not decided whether
§ 2244(d) allows for equitable tolling. Because the parties agree that equitable tolling is
available, we assume without deciding that it is.") (citations omitted); Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005) ("We have never squarely addressed the question of whether
equitable tolling is applicable to the AEDPA's statute of limitations. Because respondent
assumes that equitable tolling applies and because petitioner is not entitled to equitable
tolling under any standard, we assume without deciding its application for purposes of this
case.") (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (finding the Quiet Title
Act statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling because "[e]quitable tolling is
not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute").
114. Souter v.Jones, 395 F.d 577, 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
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applied to § 2255 motions before the passage of AEDPA, the doc-
trine continues to apply afterward. Assuming equitable tolling is
available, prisoners must satisfy the "extraordinary circumstances"
test, namely, that they have been pursuing their rights diligently
and some extraordinary circumstances prevented prisoners from
filing their petitions on time."' Courts make the test difficult to
satisfy in order to prevent the exception from swallowing the
rule.'16 Thus, courts have concluded that ignorance of the law, "7
even among pro se prisoners with limited legal research capabili-
ties,"" is not a sufficient basis for equitable tolling. Because many
prisoners who have missed their respective filing deadlines will
have done so out of ignorance or for other reasons that will not
satisfy the "extraordinary circumstances" test, they must attempt to
fit within the narrow "manifest injustice exception."
c. Manifest Injustice Exception
The "manifest injustice exception," also known as the "miscar-
riage of justice exception," applies to prisoners who are actually
innocent."" This exception is the most appropriate argument for
incorrectly sentenced prisoners, especially if other circuits adopt
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Gilbert v. United States- namely,
that prisoners who do not fit within the scope of the "savings
clause' can obtain relief through traditional 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pe-
titions where they are actually innocent of being career
115. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417.
116. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th
Cir 2000) ("[A]ny invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of a statute of limita-
tions must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship
supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes. To apply equity generously would loose the
rule of law to whims about the adequacy of excuses, divergent responses to claims of hard-
ship, and subjective notions of fair accommodation.").
117. See Shoemate v. Norris, 390 E3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding petitioner's lack
of knowledge of state procedural law insufficient for equitable tolling); Marsh v. Saores, 223
E3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding ignorance of the law, including passage of the
AEDPA, to be insufficient); Turner v.Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1999).
118. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the inability to
obtain a copy of AEDPA from library to be insufficient basis for equitable tolling).
119. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) ("'[I]n appropriate cases' the
principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield
to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration' . . . where a constitu-
tional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default.") (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
120. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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offenders."' One district court noted the absurd result that prison-
ers who were innocent of their career offender designations, but
had defaulted on their claims, and had filed a § 2255 motion
would be able to obtain relief under a traditional § 2241 habeas
petition because they could not file a successive § 2255 motion,
while those who had never filed a § 2255 motion would not be able
to obtain relief.'22 The Court equated such a conclusion as "tanta-
mount to surrendering to mere happenstance this Court's power
to provide adequate protection to victims of ... fundamental mis-
carriages of justice."' The Court further inquired: "Should an
individual be required to serve the portion of a sentence attributa-
ble to his status as a career offender, when he is actually innocent
of being a career offender? The answer must surely be no."'24 Based
upon the absurdity of the particular prisoner's circumstances, and
the Court's answer to its own query, the Court applied the "mani-
fest injustice exception" to the prisoner's procedural default. Far
more frequently, however, district courts have concluded that it is
not possible to be innocent of a career offender status, and Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have held that it is not possible to be
actually innocent of a sentence in the slightly different § 2255 "sav-
ings clause" context.'2 1 Such an approach offers promise for
resolving similar cases where prisoners have failed to file their
§ 2255 motions within the one year time limit; however, notions of
justice and judicial economy suggest that prisoners should not be
required to serve career offender sentences when they are not, in
fact, career offenders.
A § 2255 motion to vacate is the most effective mechanism for
resolving erroneously enhanced career offender sentences. How-
ever, it is limited in application to those prisoners who filed their
121. 609 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010) (va-
cating panel decision pending outcome of en banc rehearing).
122 See Scott v. United States, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Dyer v. Holland, No. 10-122-HRW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5011, at *6-7
(E.D. Ky.Jan. 19, 2011) ("Many factors other than 'career offender' status-such as prior
criminal history, victim impact, obstruction of justice, and refusal to accept responsibil-
ity-may increase a criminal defendant's sentence, but the mere lengthening of a prison
term does not transform each such factor into an independent 'offense' subject to collat-
eral review in habeas under traditionally-defined circumstances."); Pryce v. Scism, No.
1:10-CV-1680, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1171 at *10-11 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 6, 2011) ("[O]ne is not
convicted of being an 'armed career criminal.' Rather, this status is utilized as a basis to
enhance a federal sentence.").
126. See Kindler v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2000); Triestman v. United
States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Littles v. United States, 142 F. App'x. 103 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding petitioner unable to demonstrate that § 2255 was ineffective where petitioner
argued career offender enhancement was improper).
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motions within the one-year statute of limitations, can fit within the
very unusual equitable tolling circumstance, or can effectively ar-
gue in favor of the "manifest injustice" exception based upon
actual innocence of their career offender designations. Those
prisoners who previously sought relief under § 2255, however, are
effectively barred from remedying their erroneous career offender
enhancements with second or successive motions.
Once prisoners have exhausted their first § 2255 motions, they
must satisfy the following test before the Court of Appeals in order
to receive a certification permitting a second § 2255 motion, prem-
ised upon the existence of:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.
Since Begay and its progeny do not announce new rules of constitu-
tional law, prisoners are unable to obtain certification for second
or successive motions under § 2255.12" As a result, it is practically
impossible for federal prisoners, who erroneously received career
offender sentences based upon convictions for crimes that were
not violent felonies, to obtain relief under § 2255 if they have ever
previously filed § 2255 motions.
2. Section 2241
Federal prisoners generally utilize 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to chal-
lenge the execution of their sentences, not the imposition
thereof or their convictions.2 9 Section 2255 prohibits a prisoner
127. 28 § U.S.C. 2255(h) (2006).
128. See, e.g., In re Zemba, No. 10-1876, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10475 at *1 (3d Cir. May
17, 2010) (declining to certify second or successive § 2255 motion based upon Chambers and
Begay, as petitioner failed to make a "prima facie showing that these decisions state new rules
of constitutional law").
129. The Third Circuit succinctly explained that:
[f]ederal prisoners challenging some aspect of the execution of their sentence, such
as denial of parole, may proceed under Section 2241. This difference arises from the
fact that Section 2255, which like Section 2241 confers habeas corpus jurisdiction
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who is authorized to proceed under the statute from obtaining
relief under a traditional § 2241 habeas petition unless it "appears"
that the § 2255 motion remedy "is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of' a prisoner's detention. This provision is commonly
referred to as the "savings clause" because it enables § 2255 to sur-
vive judicial review since it does not suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.13 0 Courts have deemed the § 2255 motion inadequate or
ineffective in "extremely limited circumstances.""3 ' A prior unsuc-
cessful § 2255 motion 3 2 or a procedural bar1 33 do not render the
motion inadequate or ineffective.s1 3 Courts have generally deemed
a § 2255 motion to be inadequate or ineffective where the Su-
preme Court has effected a change in statutory interpretation,
made retroactively applicable, that renders previously illicit con-
duct non-criminal because such decisions are not changes in
constitutional law that could form the basis for second or succes-
sive § 2255 motions.'
The Supreme Court decision Bailey v. United States1 16 led to a
number of these rare "savings clause" petitions. The Bailey decision
limited the meaning of the term "use," as it appears in a statute
prohibiting the use of a firearm in connection with a drug of-
fense. '" The Court concluded that the term "use" cannot include
the mere possession of a firearm; rather, a defendant must have
actively employed the firearm in some manner.1" As a result, those
who had previously been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) based upon the mere possession of a firearm could
now argue that a Supreme Court decision rendered their conduct
lawful, but a second or successive § 2255 motion is inadequate or
ineffective because Bailey did not establish a new rule of constitu-
over petitions from federal prisoners, is expressly limited to challenges to the validity
of the petitioner's sentence. Thus, Section 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas
jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the valid-
ity but the execution of his sentence.
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
131. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
132. Id. Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999); Bradshaw v. Story, 86
E3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996).
133. See, e.g., Pack, 218 F.3d at 452-53 (collecting cases).
134. For an interesting relic from an era before electronic filing and video conferenc-
ing, see Stidham v. Swope, 82 E Supp. 931, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (finding motion inadequate
due to the distance between petitioner's place of confinement, Alcatraz, and the sentencing
court in Missouri).
135. In reDorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).
136. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
137. Id. at 141.
138. Id. at 143.
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tional law.13 A concise example of this fact pattern is stated in In re
Dorsainvil, a Third Circuit case utilizing the "savings clause" in light
of the Bailey decision.'" In Dorsainvil, the Court noted that "[t] here
was a gun in an open paper bag next to the driver's seat, in the
center of the pickup truck .... Dorsainvil did not touch the gun,
and was arrested without incident."l4' Thus, similar to the defend-
ant in Bailey, Dorsainvil was merely in possession of a firearm,
which is not sufficient to constitute "use" after Bailey. Other circuits
have permitted the use of § 2241 petitions through the narrow
"savings clause" in similar cases. 42 Prior to Gilbert, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that it never had cause to address whether a sentence
claim could fit within the savings clause. 43
Resolving many of these Begay career offender sentencing errors
via § 2241 petitions would increase efficiency. These petitions are
often resolved through the reports and recommendations pre-
pared by magistrate judges who not only are compensated at a low-
lower rate than district judges,14 4 but who also can be added as
needed without congressional action, presidential appointments,
or life tenure.14 ' As a result, the judiciary would have greater flexi-
bility in allocating judicial resources, namely additional magistrate
judges and accompanying law clerks, if a portion of such petitions
are initially addressable with report and recommendations.
Yet, these efficiencies and the history of habeas corpus as the
"great writ of liberty," notwithstanding, most courts that have
addressed the availability of § 2241 for prisoners whose sentences
139. See Triestman v. United States, 124 E3d 361, 369 (2d Cir. 1997); In reVial, 115 F.3d
1192, 1194-95 (4th Cir. 1997); Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341-42 (10th Cir.
1997) (per curiam); United States v. Lorensten, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curi-
am); In reBlackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1996).
140. 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 246.
142. See, e.g., In re Davenport, 147 E3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Bailey
effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that possession was
sufficient to establish "use"); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 380 ("Triestman may be innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted. Prior to bringing this petition, he had no effective oppor-
tunity to raise his claim of actual innocence. While we find that § 2255 is not available to
him, we do not believe that, in enacting the AEDPA, Congress intended to deny Triestman a
forum in which to have his claim heard. Indeed, to assume that Congress did so intend
would be to imperil the constitutional validity of the AEDPA. We hold that, in such circum-
stances, § 2255 is inadequate and/or ineffective to test the legality of Triestman's detention,
and that Triestman is therefore entitled to raise his claim of actual innocence in a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.").
143. See Flint v.Jordon, 514 F.3d 1165, 1167 (11th Cir. 2008).
144. According to the U.S. Courts web site, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalarieschart.pdf, the 2010 district
judge salary was $174,000. U.S. Magistrate Judges are compensated at 92 percent of the U.S.
DistrictJudge rate, making their 2010 salary $160,080. See 28 U.S.C. § 634(a) (2006).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 633(c).
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were erroneously enhanced based upon an incorrect definition of
"violent" have concluded that the traditional remedy is unavailable.
They have either decided that § 2255 is adequate or,146 when inad-
equate, determined that they do not possess the authority to alter
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions.
The strongest case for use of § 2241 is where prisoners have al-
ready served more time than courts could have imposed in absence
of the career offender enhancements, as the appropriate remedy
would be immediate release without the need for re-sentencing or
second-guessing what sentences other courts would have imposed
in lieu of career offender enhancements. 4" The U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral appears to have conceded § 2241 jurisdiction pursuant to the
"savings clause" in such cases.14 9 In a Virginia § 2241 habeas case,
the Respondent filed a Memorandum announcing the following
change:
The United States now asserts that district courts, through
§ 2255(e), possess jurisdiction over § 2241 habeas petitions
that challenge certain alleged sentencing errors . ... Put simp-
ly, the United States posits that resort to § 2241 is only
available for those sentences that (because of newly-available
Supreme Court authority) were erroneously enhanced as a re-
sult of ACCA such that a prisoner is serving a sentence that
exceeds the congressionally-mandated maximum punishment
for the particular offense ... ACCA serves as more than a
146. See, e.g., United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that
"actual innocence applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the
challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from
the legal classification of the predicate crimes"); see also McElhaney v. United States, No.
1:93-cr-146/1:99-cv-226, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18468 at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2011);
Carter v. Cross, No. 10-cv-639-DRH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9894 at *5 (S.D. Ill. February 2,
2011); Brown v. Fisher, No. 10-3230, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2 (Jan. 19, 2011 )(finding no
available remedy for petitioner).
147. See, e.g., Marshal v. Yost, No. 09-62J, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128405 at *27 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 3, 2010) ("This Court cannot engage in speculation as to what sentence would have
been delivered by the sentencing court ifit had known what is now known. This Court does
not have the power to order the sentencing court to re-sentence Petitioner."); Fort v. Deboo,
No. 5:08cv6, 2008 WL 4371398 at *5 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 19, 2008) ("[Tihis Court must con-
sider if it is really the appropriate forum to grant such relief. Not only are all the pertinent
records and people in the Eastern District of North Carolina, this Court has concerns that if
relief is available, it is authorized to vacate aJudgment Order issued by another Court.").
148. See Supplemental Mem. of Law Regarding Resp'ts Mot. to Dismiss at 2-4, Gal-
limore v. Stansberry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20554 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2011) (No. 1:10cv138)
(noting that Respondent has conceded § 2241 jurisdiction and granting petition where
petitioner had served more time than the ACCA would have imposed had petitioner not
been incorrectly designated an armed career criminal).
149. See Gilmore v. Stansberry, No. 1:10cv138(AJT/IDD), docket no 15, Supplemental
Memorandum of Law Regarding Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2010).
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mere sentencing enhancement provision-it requires a dis-
trict court to ignore the otherwise-applicable statutory
maximum penalty. An individual who has been erroneously
sentenced under ACCA is thus necessarily serving a sentence
that is in excess of the maximum punishment that Congress
prescribed for the particular crime."0
Although this concession likely improves the position of inmates
attempting to utilize § 2241, courts could decide they lack jurisdic-
tion if they are not persuaded by the Solicitor's position." If,
however, courts do not agree that § 2241 subject matter jurisdiction
exists where the Solicitor concedes that it does, the government
could use Rule 48152 to dismiss the original indictment, resulting in
a petitioner's immediate release.13
Unlike those sentenced under the ACCA, those incorrectly sen-
tenced under the Guidelines, technically, are not serving sentences
that the "law cannot impose upon"' them, as sentencing courts
are not bound by the Guidelines. 5 5 Although merely advisory, in
practice, courts infrequently depart above the Guideline sentence
recommendations; 5 6 thus, many prisoners incorrectly sentenced as
career offenders likely would have received lesser sentences had
their sentencing courts not erred. Yet, due to the advisory status of
the Guidelines, courts appear considerably less likely to expand
§ 2241 to encompass such claims.'57
150. Id. at 12-13. Respondent proceeds to distinguish ACCA sentences from Guideline
sentences. "An individual erroneously sentenced as a 'career offender' for purposes of the
Sentencing Guidelines, however, is not similarly-situated. The 'career offender' provisions of
the Sentencing Guidelines do not allow a sentencing court to ignore a statutory maximum
punishment; to the contrary, classification as a 'career offender' simply exposes the individ-
ual to a greater range of possible sentences for purposes of the Guidelines." Id. at 13.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) (no waiver of a lack of subject matterjurisdiction is possible).
152. Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "the government
may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The government
may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without the defendant's consent."
153. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48; Rice v. Rivera 617 F.3d 802, 811-12 (4th Cir. 2010) (approv-
ing Rule 48 motion after conviction where defendant had not "used" a firearm in light of
Bailey because the motion was not contrary to the "manifest public interest" and because the
government could seek a new trial under Rule 33, then file the same Rule 48 motion).
154. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2003).
155. Booker v. Washington, 543 U.S. 220 (2004).
156. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 38 (finding an upward depar-
ture from guideline range in 2 percent of 81,374 individual sentences imposed in 2009 for
which they received data).
157. See United States v. Nelson, No. 10-cv-61-bbc,03-cr-175-bbc, 2010 WL 4806976 at *5
(W.D. Wisc. Nov. 22, 2010) ("When challenging a sentence, as defendant is doing, the prisoner
must be able to show that his sentence imposes a punishment that the law cannot impose
upon him.") (citing Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 413 (2009)).
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The disconnect between these collateral remedies creates three
groups among those prisoners who have been incorrectly sen-
tenced as career offenders. Among the first, and most fortunate
group, are those prisoners who have not filed their § 2255 motions
and are still within their applicable statute of limitations to do so.
Without question, this is the appropriate mechanism for these
prisoners.5 However, due to the stringent requirements for obtain-
ing equitable tolling and the hesitance of courts to treat actual
innocence, rather than the underlying offense, as a basis for the
"manifest injustice exception" to procedural default, prisoners who
failed to file within the statute of limitations are unlikely to obtain
relief under § 2255.
Among the second group of prisoners are those who have previ-
ously filed § 2255 motions and, thus, are unable to file second or
successive motions. In light of the Solicitor's current position, a
portion of these cases can be effectively resolved through § 2241
petitions, namely those petitioners who have already served longer
sentences than the courts could have statutorily imposed upon
them in absence of improper career offender enhancements. Ad-
ditional prisoners may fall into this category as Gilbert, if reinstated,
and various district court decisions have applied § 2241 more
broadly than the Solicitor's current concession. Nevertheless, a
third group will remain, prisoners who received lengthier sentenc-
es based upon erroneous career offender designations, previously
filed § 2255 motions, but are also are unable to obtain relief via
§ 2241. The writ of error coram nobis is a viable mechanism for re-
solving this limited set of claims.
V. CoRAm NOBIS
Unlike its more heralded habeas counterpart, the writ of coram
nobis has been referred to as "the wild ass of the law which the
courts cannot control," 9 and likened to a cancer. 60 Despite the rel-
ative disfavor of this remedy, it appears to be the only mechanism
158. See generally Vaughn v. Rios, No. 11-cv-1001, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3663 at *2 (C.D.
Ill. Jan. 14, 2011) (dismissing § 2241 petition without prejudice in career offender case
where petitioner has not yet filed his initial § 2255 motion).
159. Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Ky. 1943). In an opinion filled with
such metaphors and literary flourishes, the Court further stated that the writ "was hoary with
age and even obsolete in England before the time of Blackstone, and courts who attempt to
deal with it become lost in the mist and fog of the ancient common law." Id. (quoting
Mitchell v. State, 176 So. 743, 747 (Miss. 1937)).
160. Richard B. Amandes, Coram Nobis-Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 HASTINGs L.J. 48
(1955).
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whereby this third group of prisoners' claims could be resolved.
This writ presents none of the comity concerns that prevent courts
from granting § 2241 petitions to this third group of prisoners. To
the contrary, it is uniquely suited to correct these types of errors,
and a review of the relevant case law reveals that courts very likely
have the power to do so.
The writ originated as a mechanism for correcting clerical or
factual errors, and it would have been granted by the court that
161
delivered the original decision at issue. It was known as either
"coram nobis" or "coram vobis," depending upon whether it was filed
before the Court of Common Pleas or the King's Bench.6  Black-
stone explained the writ as a "proceeding to reverse a judgment by
writ of error in the same court, where the error complained of is in
fact and not in law, and where of course no fault is imputed to the
court in pronouncing its judgment." 6 Blackstone offered as an
example the factual error as to the age of a party, relevant as to
whether that party is an adult to be represented by an attorney or
an infant to be represented by a guardian.'6 4 A district court's au-
thority to issue the writ emanates from the All Writs Act. 16 Both
because the Act is not an independent source of jurisdiction 6 6 and
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have eliminated the
writ in civil cases,6 these writs must be sought before, and issued
by, the courts that imposed the original sentences and treated as
part of the original criminal cases.
The Supreme Court established the availability of this remedy in
an early 19th century case, Davis v. Packard.6" The factual error in
Davis was that a trial court in New York permitted a suit to proceed
to judgment against Davis, who, as a diplomat, was immune to suit."
Following the enactment of § 2255, the Supreme Court reasserted
the availability of coram nobis in United States v. Morgan. The Court
explained that " [t] he writ of coram nobis was available at common law
to correct errors of fact. It was allowed without limitation of time for
facts that affect the 'validity and regularity' of the judgment ....
161. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 92, at 226.
162. Id.
163. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR
BOOKS, 411-12, n.12 (George Sharswood ed.,J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879).
164. Id.
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
166. See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1999) ("[T]he express terms of the
Act confine the power ... to issuing process 'in aid of' . . . existing statutory jurisdiction; the
Act does not enlarge thatjurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
167. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 60(e).
168. 33 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1834).
169. Id.
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While the occasions for its use were infrequent, no one doubts its
availability at common law."',o The Court further noted state
courts' continuous usage of the writ."' Because § 2255 only affords
relief to persons in custody, the Court determined that this motion
was unavailable to Morgan, who was no longer in custody, having
completed his federal sentence.1 2 Accordingly, the Court expressly
held that § 2255 had not eliminated the writ.75
Some courts have interpreted Morgan as applying only to those
prisoners who are no longer in custody.7 4 With an amusing decla-
ration in Melton v. United States, the Seventh Circuit has taken the
position that all attempts by prisoners in custody to obtain writs of
error coram nobis are to be automatically treated as § 2255 motions:
"Any motion filed in the district court that imposed the sentence,
and substantively within the scope of § 2255 1 1 is a motion under
§ 2255 . .. .. "17' The Court continued: " [c]all it a motion for a new
trial, arrest of judgment, mandamus, prohibition, coram nobis, co-
ram vobis, audita querela, certiorari, capias, habeas corpus ... writ
of error, or an application for a Get-Out-of-Jail Card; the name
makes no difference.""6 The Circuits have offered differing stand-
ards for granting relief. However, common among all standards is
that some other remedy must not be available, it must not be de-
fendant's "fault" for not having sought relief at some earlier date,
the continued existence of a case or controversy, and a serious na-
ture to, or injustice resulting from, the error.'77 Unsurprising, in
170. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954).
171. Id.
172. Id. Interestingly, Morgan's case was also one of sentence enhancement, in the op-
posite direction; he was attacking a prior federal conviction in order to reduce a New York
state sentence enhanced based upon his prior federal conviction. Id. at 510.
173. Id. at 511 ("We do not think that the enactment of § 2255 is a bar to this motion,
and we hold that the District Court has the power to grant such a motion.").
174. See, e.g., United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2002) ("A writ of error
coram nobis is a remedy to vacate a conviction when the petitioner has served his sentence
and is no longer in custody, as is required for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.").
175. 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2004).
176. Id.
177. See generally United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1011-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the following test must be satisfied to grant coram nobis relief: "(1) a more usual remedy
is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy require-
ment of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character"); Fleming v.
United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A] petitioner must demonstrate that
1) there are circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice, 2) sound reasons exist
for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, and 3) the petitioner continues to suffer legal
consequences from his conviction that may be remedied by granting of the writ.") (per curi-
am); United States v. Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that defendant must
show that "(1) the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal; (2) the claimed error
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light of the Court's comments in Melton, is that the Seventh Cir-
cuit's standard presumes that the individual seeking coram nobis
relief is no longer in custody."17 Recently, the Supreme Court has
again reaffirmed the availability of coram nobis and provided some
guidance as to when it should be issued.1 7 ' The Court indicated
that it must be necessary to (1) "redress a fundamental error" in
(2) "'extraordinary' cases presenting circumstances compelling its
use 'to achieve justice'" where (3) "alternative remedies, such as
habeas corpus, are [unavailable].',"o
A careful review of the cases demonstrates that these sentencing
cases are not beyond the scope of coram nobis. Though many courts
presume that an individual must no longer be in custody to effec-
tively pursue this writ, Morgan did not establish such a
requirement. Rather, the fact that Morgan was no longer incarcer-
ated was the reason why § 2255 was ineffective. At the time Morgan
was decided, some courts were not yet able to foresee a circum-
stance in which a § 2255 motion would be ineffective for a person
still in custody.'8 ' The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Dawes, issued
the writ to two defendants who were in custody at the time of issu-
ance.12 On direct appeal, the Court previously held that it was
harmless error for the district court to fail in advising the defend-
ants of the hazards of proceeding to trial pro se.'" In a later
decision, the Court determined that Supreme Court precedent
precludes the application of harmless error in such cases.'" As a
result, the Court treated the defendants' most recent pleadings as
seeking relief under coram nobis. The Court determined that § 2255
was inadequate because it permitted prisoners to challenge their
sentences, but did not enable sentencing courts to set aside their
convictions, and, as a result, coram nobis was appropriate."" The
Third Circuit similarly noted that a petitioner who was still in cus-
tody may be able to obtain relief via coram nobis if transferred back
to Virginia, as the Fourth Circuit had not issued a case similar to
is a defect of the type that 'sap[s] the proceeding of any validity'; (3) the conviction pro-
duced lingering and still extant collateral civil disabilities; and (4) the error is of a type that
'would have justified relief during the term of imprisonment").
178. See Barber, 881 F.2d at 348.
179. United States v. Denedo, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Amandes, supra note 160, at 58 ("Since the remedy by motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is completely adequate for the entire period that a prisoner is in custody un-
der a sentence, coram nobis jurisdiction was invoked in both instances for the purpose of
attacking a sentence which had run its course.").





University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the Third Circuit's Dorsainvil decision;' thus, leaving the petition-
er without remedy under § 2255 or § 2241." District courts have
considered granting the writ for those who were still in custody, but
declined to do so.' Accordingly, there is little basis for preventing
the resolution of erroneous career offender sentences with coram
nobis because the persons seeking relief remain in custody.
This third group of claims satisfies the coram nobis guidelines
most recently offered by the Supreme Court. Other than an error
resulting in the application of the death penalty to one not eligible
for such a sentence, it is difficult to conceive of an error more fun-
damental than those resulting in serving additional years in prison.
These prisoners, by definition, are the ones who are unable to ob-
tain relief under § 2255 because they have previously filed § 2255
motions or § 2241 because they were sentenced under the advisory
Guidelines, thus placing them outside the Solicitor's current con-
cession and because many courts, in the interest of comity, are
unwilling to reconsider a sentence imposed by another court, thus
leaving them without any alternative remedy. Finally, these cases
are the extraordinary result of a series of decisions creating collat-
eral relief for some prisoners who were incorrectly sentenced as
career offenders based upon past convictions later held by the Su-
preme Court to be non-violent. This is the unusual type of
circumstance for which this remedy was intended. Finally, sentenc-
es are not beyond the scope of the type of error coram nobis can
remedy. Whether or not a defendant has been convicted a given
number of times for committing violent felonies is not different, in
nature, from an error as to a litigant's age" at the time of trial.
Such a factual.o error was a sufficient basis for a state court to use
186. Dorsainvi4 119 F.3d at 245 (holding that the savings clause applies where subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions render previously illicit conduct lawful).
187. InreNwanze,242F.3d521,526 (3dCir. 2001).
188. Fort v. Deboo, No. 5:08CV6, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 89581 at *10 (N.D. W.V. Nov. 4,
2008) (construing four counts of a § 2241 petition as petitions for writs of error coram nobis
and transferring to the sentencing court because the § 2241 court did not think it had the
authority to vacate the sentence of another court); United States v. Granmayeh, 31 F. Supp.
2d 529, 529-30 (D. Md. 1999) (considering petitioner in custody for coram nobis, but declin-
ing to grant relief on the facts of the case).
189. BLACKSTONE, supra note 163.
190. Tempting though it may be as a legal puzzle, it is not necessary for purposes of this
Article to address whether a similar, but even less frequently addressed remedy, audita
querela, might be even more fitting than coram nobis. This alternative writ is used to attack
judgments that were correct at the time they were issued, but later became infirm. See Unit-
ed States v. Salazar, No. 04-20013, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69851 at *1 (D. Ks. Aug. 10, 2009).
One could argue that these erroneous sentences were correct at the time of imposition, but
later became infirm due to intervening Supreme Court precedent. The contrary argument
would be that the Supreme Court precedent are applied retroactively because these sen-
tences and the Courts of Appeals decisions upon which they rely were erroneous at the time
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coram nobis in 1882 to correct a defendant's sentence. 9' Moreover,
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Denedo that:
Any rationale confining the writ to technical errors, however,
has been superseded; for in its modern iteration, coram nobis is
broader than its common-law predecessor. This is confirmed
by our opinion in Morgan. In that case we found that a writ of
coram nobis can issue to redress a fundamental error, there a
deprivation of counsel .... 192
Therefore, it appears that district courts may be able, if they are
willing to overlook the unconventional nature of this writ, to re-
solve this third group of prisoner claims. Such resolutions would be
especially efficient, as they would be performed by the sentencing
courts, the courts in the best position to determine what sentences
they would have imposed absent career offender enhancements.
Use of the writ would also eliminate any comity concerns faced when




In the most literal sense of the words, for those inmates who
were incorrectly designated as career offenders based upon non-
violent felonies, injustice has bred injustice. Not only was their
layman's understanding of "violent" correct all along, but now they
must serve their enhanced sentences anyway. Though the more
traditional motions to vacate and habeas corpus petitions will be
the appropriate remedy for some prisoners, those remaining will
be left without remedy unless sentencing courts are willing to uti-
lize coram nobis. Even if not moved by the plight of these less than
model citizens, the costs of controlling this disfavored "wild ass"
they were decided. However, because coram nobis has evolved beyond its common law bounds
of correcting technical factual errors that were infirm at the time of decision, see United
States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009), there is no reason to consider audita querela as
a considerably less well established alternative.
191. Ex parte Gray, 77 Mo. 160, 161 (1882) (holding that lower court properly used co-
ram nobis to release a minor defendant who had been improperly sentenced as an adult).
192. United States v. Dendeo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009).
193. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HoUSE 159 (Collier 1900) (1853).
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seem minor in comparison to the social costs of unnecessary incar-
ceration.
Without the use of this non-traditional remedy, the law, as it is
currently written, appears to afford no remedy to inmates who
were incorrectly sentenced as career offenders under the Guide-
lines based upon prior non-violent convictions, but who also
previously litigated motions to vacate. The number of inmates who
have fallen into the gap between § 2255 and § 2241 may continue
to grow if the scope of "violent" felonies continues to narrow
through future appellate and Supreme Court decisions. Because
arguably non-violent crimes, such as failing to pull over for a police
officer,19 4 trespassing to a dwelling,1 95 possessing a "sawed-off' shot-
gun," and concealing a handgun without a permit197 are deemed
violent in at least one jurisdiction, future narrowing of the scope of
the ACCA is possible, if not likely. Such narrowing would further
increase the number of inmates who can claim to be serving addi-
tional time because of erroneous career offender designations.
Thus, these claims may not simply fade away with the passage of
time.
194. See United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745-46 (7th Cir. 2008).
195. See United States v. Corner, 588 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 2009) vacated on other
grounds, 598 E3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
196. See United States v. Lipscomb, 619 E3d 474, 479 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding possession
of a "sawed-off" shotgun to be a crime of violence under the Guidelines). But see United
States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding possession of a "sawed-off'
shotgun not to be violent under the ACCA).
197. See Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies Under the Residual Clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun Without a Permit Should be Considered a
Violent Felony, 48 DuQ. L. REV. 601, 602-03 (2010) (noting split on issue, arguing in favor
of inclusion as violent felony).
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